Kelly Taylor
HACU 227 Philosophy of Religion
Question #5
Sept 26, 2001

In this extended essay, Hume examines the evolution of human religion. He posits that religion, "belief of invisible, intelligent power," is common to the entire human race, although he admits that there is neither universal belief in such, nor are the existent beliefs uniform.(21) This lack of universality and uniformity leads him to believe that therefore Religion is not instinctual, but learned. The rest of the work is dedicated to determining the causes and nature of the various forms of the Religions of Man.

According to Hume, the original form of religion is polytheism, and further, that natural human religious inclinations are polytheistic in nature, and that great effort and care is required to avoid slipping back towards polytheism in supposedly monotheistic religions. His initial arguments for this view are twofold: firstly that no religion could ever evolve from monotheism to polytheism (a statement he later contradicts) because once Men have seen, through reasoning, the "pure spirit, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent" nature of the Deity, they could never again revert to the inferior state of polytheism.(24) Secondly, he gives several examples of how, throughout history, religion has evolved from polytheistic paganism, such as in the "savage tribes of America, Africa and Asia" to monotheistic organized religion, particularly Judaism, Islam and Christianity.(23) The "ignorant and barbarous" idolaters and polytheists are clearly inferior and animalistic as compared to the superior, reasoning religion of monotheism.

Without reasoning, says Hume, one cannot speculate on the works of nature and arrive at the obvious logical conclusion that there was one creator "who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine" which in turn can only lead to monotheism.(26) Instead, he states, "the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind."(27) In Hume's view, the primitive barbarian's life is full of random events controlled by unseen and unknowable forces, which become the focus of his superstitious divinatory practices.

As the barbarian seeks an explanation of life and insight into what blows or fortunes might come next, the dire necessities of daily life are determined to be under the control of the gods. This immediate, personal relationship to the gods is what distinguishes the polytheist from the rational, lofty, intellectual monotheist who sees God in the workings of the entire world, as "this philosophy exceeds the comprehension of the ignorant multitude."(29)

Each aspect of life has an opposite number, and therefore each contrasting element must be controlled by a conflicting invisible power. From this perspective religion is based on fear of life itself, and humans create gods from the observation of the powers that influence their individual personal lives for better or for worse - the personified powers that control draught and storms, famine and plenty, pestilence and health, war and birth. The deity in immediate control of each individual aspect of life is then supplicated at appropriate times: "Juno is invoked at marriages; Lucina at births. Neptune receives the prayers of seamen; and Mars of warriors" and so on. (27)

One's superstition increases proportionately to the amount of perceived danger in one's life, according to Hume, and since early and "primitive" Men can only see the world in anxious confusion, they are by default more prone to superstitious religious practices than "civilized" Men. However, regardless of proximity to danger and potential for chaos, the underlying cause that inspires Men to seek divinity is strife of any kind. Says Hume, "the mind, sunk into diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those secret intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is supposed entirely to depend."(31) Here we see the true fundamental reason for their religious practice: supplication of one's gods so as to win their favor. They do not seek to praise or honor their gods for the creation of the world, says Hume, for in none of the examples he gave are the gods attributed creation, and cites Classical authors who do not consider their deities in the search for the origins of the world. (32-33) Instead, they seek to better their fortunes, succeed at war, have healthy children, and fertile crops. Pleasing the gods is crucial to these benefits, and the religions of man are furthered by greater and greater efforts to do so, from refusing to extinguish any fire with water, to genital mutilation, to wearing bits of cloth in the appropriate manner, to animal and human sacrifice. (46)

From this incessant and urgent need to go further and further in ones own actions to please the gods, comes the notion of elevating and praising those gods in higher and higher terms in words of praise and ritual. One deity becomes paramount to the others, either because the supplicants consider themselves "subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity" or because they infer the structure of heavenly organization parallels that of humans, and therefore "represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest."(43)

Carried to its furthest extreme, this becomes monotheism: as with courtiers who elevate princes to the status of godhood, the deity is praised in higher and higher terms, "till at last they arrive at infinity itself."(43) Hume is careful to point out that this understanding is not achieved through Rational argument and discourse, but instead from ideas built upon "irrational and superstitious principles."(42) This distinction foreshadows the inevitable fall back to polytheism, which Man cannot seem to resist.

Because even dogmatically monotheistic religions continue to tolerate vestigiary sub-deities and "middle beings," unless a prohibition on acknowledging such is strictly enforced (as in Judaism and Islam, according to Hume) a tendency to backslide into polytheism arises.(48) Hume refers to this as the "flux and reflux of polytheism and theism." For the most part he attributes this to the fact that no humans, with few exceptions, look at the signs given to us in the supreme artistry of the works of nature for proof of the existence of a divine creator, but instead focus their attention on their own lives or cultures and attribute divinity to the forces that determine their success or failure. Because the abstract and ethereal nature of a God so removed from our individual lives leaves us uncomfortable and nervous about the security of our own existence, we seek out representations of the deity that are more familiar and closer related to the individual issues at hand. "Hence the origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or polytheism."(47)

This reflux into polytheism is often facilitated by the existence of pre-existing concepts within many religions. Ideals of a Deity elevated to such "utmost bounds of perfection" as "unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality" become too lofty to sustain, "disproportioned to vulgar comprehension."(47) Thus intermediary beings, more closely related to humans or even beings that were once human themselves, must be employed to transport our prayers, praise, actions and expectations to the higher deity with whom we have lost contact. In many religions these intermediary beings were already a part of that religion, either as vestigial minor deities of its polytheistic origins, or even humans elevated to higher status through Works or proximity to the deity. Hume cites the Virgin Mary and St. Nicholas as examples of this second type, and one might also include Angels in this order of beings. (44, 37).

Using these intermediary beings in religious practice is tantamount to polytheism, and great precautions must be taken to avoid patterns that could produce idolatry, as in Judaic and Islamic practices at the time which included: "banishing all the arts of statuary and painting, and not allowing the representations, even of human figures, to be taken by marble or colours."(48) Even with these precautions, Men are irresistibly drawn from one extreme to the other: from base pagan polytheism which pushes its gods ever higher, to the ultimate supreme deity ruling coldly from on high, to intermediate beings that are not quite gods, which then dissolve again into the polytheism originally escaped. "The heroes in paganism correspond exactly to the saints in popery, and holy dervises in Mahometanism."(52)

Here we begin to see what Hume is driving at, that polytheism and monotheism are but two faces of the same coin: popular religion. Each has its vices and virtues, which often serve to clearly highlight the opposite in each form. Hume has very strong criticisms of each which dig to the fundamental core differences and similarities between the two forms of popular religion. The differences in value systems represented by each are incredibly profound.

Where idolatry ascribes only weak and limited powers to its deities, it simultaneously "renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other."(48-49) This is in sharp contrast to monotheistic religions which, in all of Hume's examples, are entirely intolerant of any other religious dogmas other than their own, and in cases where there might be superficial tolerance, it is only out of obedience to "the steady resolution of the civil magistrate, in opposition to the continued efforts of priests and bigots."(50) Taken to the extreme, both approaches have their pitfalls: polytheism can result in overly-vague religious structure that allow for no moral substance or consistency of theology that can act as guidance for a people. Hume provides the example of the Romans who incorporated almost every religion it encountered, either in its entirety or in part.

In the case of strict monotheism the furthest extension of intolerance is the persecution of heretics, as the religions that accept only one deity also "require the unity of faith and ceremonies." (49) This single-minded adherence to the precept that only one way can possibly be acceptable to God results in the view of heretics as "the objects of divine as well as human vengeance."(49) The ultimate result of this perspective is worse than all but "few of the corruptions of idolatry and polytheism," which is the punishment of murder for heresy, and Hume even goes so far as to state that human sacrifices made by barbarous nations are more justified, and less damaging to a society than the "fatal vengeance of inquisitors."(51)

Another slightly less polemic example of the moral distinctions between polytheism and monotheism is the difference in attitude towards life between the followers, especially in regard to what constitutes acceptable sacrifice. "A sacrifice is conceived as a present" says Hume, and a present to the gods, in polytheistic religions, must first be rendered useless to man by burning, spilling, killing, or destroying.(51, footnote 3) Although Hume finds it merely deceitful that we impress the gods by harming ourselves, he doesn't have nearly as much vehement distaste for that type of sacrifice as he does for the monotheistic penchant for self-sacrifice and abasement. When the deity is perceived as infinitely superior, beyond competition or question, humans "represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering as the only qualities which are acceptable to him."(52) Rather, he compares this to what is evoked by a perception of the deity as only slightly superior to mankind: "activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people."(52) This is illustrated in the example of a Greek hero seizing a mouse and, upon being bitten, letting go of it as contrasted to the Catholic saint who "patiently and humbly allowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey upon him."(52-3) Hume seems to agree that this Christian monotheist attitude, according to Machiavel, "subdued the spirit of mankind, and had fitted them for slavery and subjection."(52)

Previously in his arguments, Hume had demonstrated that polytheism was not and could not be founded on reason, and in fact was a primitive, inferior form of religion to monotheism that must therefore then unreasonable or "absurd."(21-24, 3) Later he concedes that most polytheistic mythologies, when examined carefully, are not the "monstrous absurdity" one might initially suspect, but that the chief issue with polytheism is the weakness of foundation of tradition and mythology. Polytheistic mythologies are not entirely incomprehensible or improbable; however, there is no evidence for their validity or error, and many traditions are contradictory yet given equal authority. Because the stories, tales and creation myths had very little basis in any sort of textural work, dogmatic teaching or evidence, the religions associated with them are left without a solid foundation in reality and rationality.(53)

While a religion made up more of "traditional stories and superstitious practices than of philosophical argument and controversy" is unacceptable to Hume, he also finds fault in the theological systems where Philosophy is "at every turn perverted to serve the purposes of superstition."(54) Monotheistic theology is never content to stay within the boundaries of "reason and common sense," but instead must push beyond the easy and familiar and into the realm of the amazing and supernatural. Instead of the expected purity of reason one would find in monotheism, the affectations of theology cause men to begin "subduing their rebellious reason" and therefore Hume concludes that "all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction."(54) His disillusionment is apparent when he says "Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires, which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philosophers."(54)

The final distinction Hume makes between the practices of theism and polytheism is in how the practitioners treat the earthly symbols of their deity. The focus of this examination is the Christian tradition of the transubstantiation of the Eucharist and subsequent consumption, about which he declares "of all religions, the most absurd and nonsensical is that, whose votaries eat, after having created, their deity," and goes even further to say that "it is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all argument."(55) He illustrates this absurdity with anecdotes of converted polytheists who still cannot embrace this concept among all the others of monotheism.

It would seem, then, that Hume's disillusionment with monotheism combined with the unacceptability of polytheism would lead one to believe that he advocates the abandonment of all attempts at religiosity. It is my understanding, however, that this is not the case. Despite his original statements, his only problems with polytheism are its evolutionary inferiority, lack of discrimination in which theologies to accept and the subsequent lack of rational evidence for the stories that comprise their mythological system. Morally and philosophically he doesn't seem to have any problems with the given examples of polytheism. The following quote praises polytheism so highly one might then think that he was advocating conversion to polytheism, although this is not the case:

What Hume is advocating is a religious tradition unlike any seen in modern society, one that is founded in reason and the reasonableness of God, as well as the belief that the supreme deity is the sole creator of the world. Only the highest principles of human value systems should be ascribed to this divinity, and the only rites and worship should be the continued upholding of those same virtues and principles among our neighbors. If there are clergy and sermons, their sole purpose should be to help the common people uphold those standards and expectations and men should be judged solely on whether or not they successfully uphold them. Accusations of heresy and persecution for differing belief structures and mythological traditions would not exist.

Very few existing religions that even approach these goals, with the possible exceptions of Quakerism and Zen Buddhism. These are admirable aspirations for any man following any religion, and though some of his views pushed the boundaries of religion and science, these tenets above are not entirely antithetical to certain forms of Protestant Christianity.

This can only be accomplised through reform to remove all impurities of irrationality and impiety from popular religions, both polytheistic & monotheistic. He states that the origin of all religions of mankind is the "anxious fear of future events," and, being founded in fear, all religions continue to hold fear as a requirement of fellowship in that faith, and even ascribe elements of their worst terror to their gods.(65) However, other inherent qualities of religion which include the "spirit of praise and eulogy" cause man to simultaneously ascribe the ultimate heights of virtue and excellence to the deity. (65-66) Where polytheism acknowledges the dual nature of the deities and knowingly flatters their gods with false words, theism pretends there is no duality, but this is belied by superstition and fear, which is labeled piety.(67)

In Hume's ideal religion "nothing but morality could gain the divine favour," which would effectively eliminate the need for superstitious attempts at winning God's favor, although he worries that the priests of such a religion would make the attendance of sermons the basis of the religion, rather than the content preached therein.(70-71) Ideally men would use their "natural reason" to value virtue and honesty above all others, and therefore "ascribe the same sentiment to his deity."(71) It his Hume's goal to "make all religion, or the chief part of it, to consist in these attainments." (71)

The argument that in this new theology "the practice of morality is more difficult than that of superstition" is denied repeatedly. Examples of extreme hardship endured for the sake of "superstition" include the Islamic fasting rituals of Ramadan, Lent of the Catholics and Muscovites, and others.(71) Instead of these self-sacrifices and tortures, one should follow the same inclinations that lead one to do right by neighbor and friend, the "ties of nature and morality" conjoined with "a sentiment of order and moralye obligation."(71) Religion should include and encourage even the more austere virtues such as "public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity" and especially states that "the most genuine method of serving the divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures."(72) The deity should not be represented as barbarous, capricious and tremendous in order to make humans more "tame and submissive," as in traditional monotheism. This makes the requirements for acceptance by the deity greater and more extreme, and therefore "the more necessary does it become to abandon our natural reason."(73)

It would seem that had Hume been born a century and a half later he would have been a strict Darwinist, but in light of his times, and given the atrocious heresy of atheism (something he alludes to and is almost defensive about), the only other choice is to form a new religion free from the impurities inherent in popular religion. In this new religion (Humianism?) both Faith and Works would be required as evidence of peity, but not in the sense that each had been practiced previously. Being staunchly opposed to irrational and superstitions ritual, Humians would reflect their religious beliefs of virtues in every aspect of life, not merely in times of trial or in the proscribed holidays and rituals. Though a purely rational religion seems impossible, if one starts with the belief that there is a God who created the universe and is the epitome of virtue, basing a religion on the honor and emulation of such a God is not so hard to imagine.